Crimean Solution: Emporium Not Empire

Copyright © 2014 by Thomas Gangale
@ThomasGangale

The current crisis in Ukraine can hardly come as a surprise to anyone who remembers that two decades ago Samuel P. Huntington cited it as one of the "cleft countries" that straddle the fault lines between what he referred to as "civilizations," or to anyone who has bothered to give a casual glance to voting pattern maps throughout Ukraine's post-Soviet history. Western Ukraine, mostly Ukrainian-speaking and Roman Catholic, wants to be a member of the club of European states, while eastern Ukraine, mostly Russian-speaking and Russian Orthodox, wants to be a member of a club of Eurasian states.

The problem is that the internal borders of the Soviet Union were drawn for certain purposes of domestic politics of the time, and that these borders became international borders when the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. Those borders are now forced to serve purposes that were not intended when they were drawn, and they serve modern purposes badly. Unfortunately, while the borders of internal political territorial divisions are easy to change, borders become set in stone once they become international borders. The integrity of such borders is a fundamental principle of the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states.

In 1954 Premier Nikita Khrushchev was able to transfer Crimea from Russian Republic to the Ukrainian Republic within the Soviet Union with a mere stroke of the pen. Now the shoe is on the other foot, and in 2014 Crimea, the territory of a sovereign Ukraine, cannot be handed back to Russia so easily.

Territorial annexation by right of military conquest was once axiomatic in international relations, but an international norm began to develop against this ancient principle in the early 20th century in reaction to the devastation of the First World War, and this norm became even stronger as a result of the Second World War, to the point that territorial expansion through the use of force became illegal.

However, there is no prohibition against the peaceful transfer of territory by an international treaty. It comes down to the art of the deal. Ukraine and Russia could avoid a violent conflict by coming to the negotiating table in good faith.

Russia wants Crimea for historical reasons, because of the peninsula's majority Russian population, and because of its strategic naval ports and other military facilities. That is understandable. At the same time, Ukraine wants to keep Crimea simply because, as they say, "possession is nine points of the law." That is understandable as well. However, the Ukrainian government is on the brink of insolvency, and its economy needs Russia as an energy supplier. So, why not negotiate a treaty ceding Crimea to Russia in exchange for such economic compensation as Russia assuming the Ukrainian government's debt to date, or Russia supplying Ukrainian energy needs at a subsidized price for a specified number of years? Both sides would walk away from the table with something of value, and neither one would suffer the ravages of war. Do svidaniya, and don’t get any on ya.

It was thoughtful of Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich to give Crimea to his native Ukraine, but sometimes well-intended gifts prove to be unsuitable. The modern capitalist practice is to return such a gift in exchange for a cash refund or a store credit.

With the Crimean crisis thus defused, there would be time for cooler heads to consider the ramifications of future Ukrainian membership in the European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

BACKGROUND:

In 2002, at the very beginning of his international relations studies, Gangale urged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to continue inviting Eastern European nations to become members, citing that this would enhance European security, would incentivize these states to build stable democracies, and in parallel with membership in the European Union, would provide opportunities to build prosperous market economies. Although other international relations scholars predicted that these fragile states in tradition from communism would be unable to bear the costs of upgrading their militaries to NATO standards, in fact these states posted higher economic growth than what then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to as the "Old Europe." Also, some scholars were warning that NATO's eastward expansion would antagonize Russia and encourage the rise of ultranationalist influence in the Russian government, yet this did not come to pass; we had Vladimir Putin then and we still have Vladimir Putin now. (Note that the 2014 crisis has been precipitated by Putin’s fear of the prospect of Ukraine developing economic ties to the European Union, whereas prior to the crisis NATO had not seriously considered Ukrainian membership in the Atlantic alliance.) Gangale also pointed out back then that NATO becomes less threatening as it expands its membership simply because decisions for “out of area operations” must be taken by consensus among an increasing number of members. In retrospect, his 2002 work on NATO expansion has been a most successful prediction of the future.