a policy paper
PART 3
THE SECOND COLD WAR
Russia’s aggression demonstrates that under its present leadership, it has once again become a diseased state, just as it was under communist rule. Its internal symptoms are repression and corruption, and its external symptom is territorial ambition, that is to say that like cancer it loves to spread. Many observers believed that Russia enjoyed a period of remission during the 1990s; it was weak, yes, from the amputations of the Soviet breakup and from economic “shock therapy,” but it was now cancer-free. Quite the contrary, the cancer was still there, learning to attack different types of cells, and now it has come roaring back.
Such a diseased state must be isolated and contained… or destroyed. Obviously, the former course of treatment is the more principled one, and also the safer one. Thus, the international community would do well to re-familiarize itself with the George Kennan playbook for winning the First Cold War, to review what worked well and what did not, and to make the necessary adjustments for the different circumstances of the early twenty-first century. Most of all, there must be a deep, global commitment to winning the Second Cold War if it is to be fought effectively, cohesively, consistently, and brought to a successful conclusion quickly. Failure of commitment will result in a second Crimea, possibly in eastern Ukraine, possibly in northern Kazakhstan, possibly elsewhere, but surely the cancer will spread.
Accordingly, the international community must engage in a coordinated effort to put unbearable pressure on the Russian leadership. It must be pressed on all points imaginable and feasible, as long as the utility function of the policy is positive, i.e. it hurts Russia much more than it hurts us, and it is consistent with international norms of state behavior.
Hopefully, Yulia Tymoshenko will stand for election to the Ukrainian presidency and win. She is very likely the strongest unifying force in Ukrainian politics, and she has the street credibility of on-the-job experience and jail time. The opening moves in the chess game against the Russian leadership will be played before the election, but once a new government is in place in Kiev, one that has the legitimacy of a free and fair election, the forces available to be deployed against the Russian leadership will be multiplied. In particular, with Tymoshenko as president, opposition to Russian aggression can play the gender card to great effect, portraying Vladimir Putin as the matinee villain tying the beautiful damsel to the railroad tracks. At this point, we move to the middle game. Severe travel restrictions, asset freezes, strong economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation should follow the election within a few weeks.
Additional steps to be considered later in 2014 are:
- Suspend of Russian membership in international organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization). Expulsion from these institutions would be the next step.
- Accelerate Ukrainian entry into the European Union.
- Initiate the process of adding Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
There is no infrastructural connection between Crimea and Russia other than a ferry. Severance of all trade between Ukraine to Crimea: electrical power lines, natural gas and water pipelines, food transport, and communications cables would impose enormous costs on Russia to provide the material needs of the Crimean population. It would also give Russia a propaganda issue of a humanitarian crisis manufactured by the West. Additionally, such an action would carry the risk of a violent Russian reaction, using it as a pretext to install a puppet government in Kiev. A subtler approach would be for Ukraine to incrementally raise prices on the goods and services that it provides to Crimea. Additionally, because of Ukraine’s weakness compared to Russia, the Ukrainian government should look for ways to “best” Russia (since it cannot “beat” Russia, it should endeavor to find a way to come off better than expected) via a “Machiavella strategy” as described by feminist international relations scholar Karin M. Fierke in 1999.
Vladimir Putin relies on a small circle of intimates for advice; their thinking is insular. John Dalberg-Acton is remembered for his observation, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Often overlooked is the second sentence of the quote: “Great men are almost always bad men.” This is because it is the human mind that is susceptible to the corruptive nature of power, and therefore, the longer one holds power, the more ones character is warped by it. Putin has been in power since the beginning of this century; his mind is no longer what it was when he first took power. The strategy of the international community should be to make the mind of Putin and of his circle its primary targets. The present Russian leadership circle will make mistakes that the international community should overlook no opportunity to exploit. In contrast, the necessity for a pluralistic international community to build consensus is often seen as a weakness, one that the Putin regime aims to exploit, yet this also has its strengths in that it presents the opportunity for diverse points of view to be aired, reducing the risk of “group-think” and of miscalculation. The international community must endeavor to be as decisive and as swift as possible within its inherent constraints, mindful that although Putin’s small circle can be swifter, it runs the perennial danger of being swift in the wrong directions. Ultimately, these corrupted old men will suffer the agony of power slipping away in their declining years, adding to their rage against the Darkness.
Actions to be considered in out-years of the conflict:
The international community should continue to ratchet up the diplomatic isolation of Russia. It should continue to vote on resolutions in the United Nations Security Council, forcing Russia to exercise its veto. Among the resolutions that should be considered, so long as there is the prospect of support by a majority of the members and of the permanent members, are to:
1) Suspend Russia’s membership in the UN pursuant to Article 5 of the Charter,
2) Expulsion of Russia from the UN pursuant to Article 6 of the Charter.
3) Creation of an International Criminal Tribunal for Russia for the purpose of indicting Russian leaders for war crimes and crimes against the peace of the world.
The US should rapidly develop its natural gas fields as well as the ability to service the European market.
The fifteen republics of the Soviet Union and their half-dozen eastern European satellite states were not a successful autarky. An economically isolated Russia is even less viable. Many of the economic ills of the Soviet system remain in different forms. The economy is dominated by monopolies and oligopolies. Left to itself, the Russian economy will perform poorly. As their standard of living falls farther behind the rest of the world, Russians will seriously reflect on why their nationalism has angered the world, and they will increasingly and more openly question the Russian leadership.
Finally, the West should continue to be just what it is. The most invasive program to Putin’s political machine is the message of liberty. The Russian people have been receiving that message since the end of the Cold War, and their ability to connect to the rest of the world has increased with the development of the Internet. Closing the barn door now would be problematic. Putin can only fool some of the people some of the time. Russians’ appetite for outside news and entertainment will increase as it becomes increasingly restricted, and despite the drumbeat of Kremlin propaganda, they will wonder why the Kremlin turned with world against Russia yet again.
Cold War or Hot Deal: The World's Options in the Ukraine Crisis, Part 1
Cold War or Hot Deal: The World's Options in the Ukraine Crisis, Part 2
Cold War or Hot Deal: The World's Options in the Ukraine Crisis, Part 4
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