a policy paper
PART 4
END GAME
The world needs to decide what the end state is that it can accept as “victory.” One end state is the most obvious one: Russia returns to Ukraine Crimea (and any other territory that Russia may occupy or annex). This would be a humiliating defeat for Russia, and therefore it is unlikely to be achieved and only at great cost, as imposing such a defeat will meet with the bitterest resistance. A second end state may be more achievable, and ultimately it may be palatable to both sides.
The Russian perspective must be seriously considered. The costs that the international community can impose on Russia have been discussed. Balanced against these are what Russia values:
1) Crimea was Russian territory for nearly two centuries before the advent of the Soviet Union, and it remained part of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic until 1954, when Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian who had recently come to power and who was still consolidating his power, transferred Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. This transfer made little difference “on the ground” while both Russia and Ukraine were republics of the Soviet Union. It only became a distinction with a difference with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence in 1991. Compared with the centuries of history as part of Russia and then the Soviet Union, Crimea’s experience as a constituent part of an independent Ukrainian state is only 23 years old.
2) The population of Crimea is predominately ethnic Russian.
3) By agreement between Ukraine and Russia following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet is based in ports in Crimea.
The diplomatic and economic sanctions that can be imposed are intended to make this cost of holding Crimea unacceptably high to the Russian government. A second approach is to offer a solution that is less costly to Russia, the cession of Crimea to Russia at a fair price.
The cession of territory from one sovereign state to another has most commonly occurred as a feature of a treaty ending a war: one side wins and one side loses. In the case of Crimea, the appearance of such an arrangement must be avoided assiduously. If there is to be a negotiated settlement of the Crimean Crisis, everyone must go home a winner.
A much less common type of cession is a familiar facet of American history: the Louisiana Purchase, the Gadsden Purchase, and the Alaska Purchase. More than one-third of the territory of the United States was bought from foreign powers. However, the history of sovereign territorial purchases is virtually nonexistent outside of the nineteenth century United States, and thus, unfortunately, it is a potential solution that has been overlooked in the Crimean Crisis.
Nevertheless, a Crimea Purchase would allow Russia to gain what it values at a much lower cost than what it stands to lose from global diplomatic and economic isolation. In exchange for offering Crimea to Russia, Ukraine could expect a cash settlement that its government desperately needs, given that it is on the brink of default on international loans. Furthermore, Ukraine could expect to negotiate a contract for Russian oil and natural gas at a price guaranteed and subsidized by the Russian government for a certain term of years. Russia gets what it wants, Ukraine gets what it needs, the national pride of both sides is satisfied, and the world can get back to the business of building peace and prosperity for all.
This offer should be deployed at a strategic moment early in the middle game when the Russian leadership has come to realize that the steps taken by the international community in the opening game is Indeed merely the beginning of its response and that there are more consequences to come.
Any war, including a cold war, has an overall negative utility function. Even the eventual victors must accept damage in the pursuit of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage on the enemy, and the economic isolation of Russia would impose not inconsiderable costs on the global economy. In contrast, a negotiated settlement to a crisis has a positive utility function. Everyone gains something that they value.
POSTSCRIPT
The twenty-first century world is more deeply integrated than was the post-Second World War world. Because of this, some assert that waging a Second Cold War would be impractical; that the global economy, having been woven together, its unraveling will hurt everyone. While this is undoubtedly true, and even obvious, it is also irrelevant. In the power politics of the realist perspective of international relations theory, relative gains are a more important consideration than absolute gains.
In 2002, Gangale wrote: “Because the world as a whole has yet to arrive at Francis Fukuyama’s (actually an update on G. W. F. Hegel’s) “End of History,” realism may from time to time inform our dealings with nonliberal [sic] regimes who are still stuck in History.” While other theoretical perspectives have their valuable insights according to the nature of the prevailing international situation, in times of tension realism comes to the fore. Putin has decided to drag Russia back into History, and in response, we must practice realpolitik once again.
Cold War or Hot Deal: The World's Options in the Ukraine Crisis, Part 1
Cold War or Hot Deal: The World's Options in the Ukraine Crisis, Part 2
Cold War or Hot Deal: The World's Options in the Ukraine Crisis, Part 3
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