A recent op-ed in the
Global Times begins, "Tensions are rising in the South China Sea as the US has intensified its intervention, and Vietnam and the Philippines are acting more ruthlessly. It's a similar case with Japan. Challenges from both areas constitute China's new diplomatic state."
Exactly what are these alleged ruthless acts on the part of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan? What is the nature of the alleged US intervention? The
Global Times article goes on to say, "China is at a delicate point in its rising process… the uncertainty oozing from such a rise is discussed and even hyped up by the outside world. The US, as well as China's other neighboring countries have unprecedented ambitions to contain China's use of growing influence." This is rhetoric rather than analysis.
According to the realist theoretical perspective of international relations, conflict occurs when a rising, revisionist power challenges a status quo power with the aim of redefining the power relationship. The zero-sum game of relative gains is played again and again. Institutionalists, particularly G. John Ikenberry, point to the "stickiness" of international institutions established by the US and its allies since the end of the Second World War. As Nicolo Machiavelli wrote, "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new." Once established, and having proven useful over the course of decades in reducing transaction costs, whether diplomatic or economic, global institutions are not abandoned lightly.
The American-led post-Second World War and post-Cold War institutions have accommodated, even facilitated, China's economic rise, while quite candidly they have also sought to constrain its strategic choices. As on a fault line between tectonic plates, stress builds between the institutional stickiness that has locked in advantages for the status quo powers and the rising, revisionist power's ambition to change the power relationship to its advantage. The uncertainty is whether a Chinese "breakout" from the existing infrastructure of global institutions in favor of seeking to establish a new world order of its own design would be worth the cost.
Among the stress points on the strategic fault line between China and its neighbors are small, uninhabited and disputed islands situated among them.
The
Global Times article opines that "it's a demanding and risky job to let other countries get used to China's rise and treat China as a major power." Does the Chinese leadership see this as their job? If so, trash-talking its neighboring states only makes what they may already perceive as a "demanding job" even tougher.
The article asserts that China "must strike a balance between securing its territorial waters and maintaining a vibrant growth trend." Pursuant to Article 2 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, "Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention." Is there really some threat to the security of China's territorial waters, or is the problem that China is seeking to establish an immoderate claim to waters that are well beyond the 12 nautical mile limit? For the
Global Times to characterize the subject of the dispute as involving "territorial waters" bespeaks a definition of the term that is alien to international law.
The
Global Times article observes that "China faces a dilemma with its growing power. On the one hand, it will be confronted by neighbors like Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, and other stakeholders like the US if it makes use of its power." There is no dark conspiracy here; rather, this is an instance of the classic "security dilemma" that every state has faced throughout history, not just China. The more powerful a state is, the more its neighbors tend perceive it as being a potential threat; thus they also seek to increase their power in pursuit of their own security, which makes the first state feel insecure despite its increased power. Subjecting those neighbors to verbal abuse and threats only exacerbates the dilemma. Why do Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan deserve to be characterized as "unscrupulous?" Are they not simply pursuing their national interests as other states do? The fact that national interests may conflict does not necessarily make the other side the "bad guy;" that's just life.
In a bit of patriotic pandering, the
Global Times article claims that "China also bears pressure from the inside, which simply calls for a rough stand against provocations from Vietnam and the Philippines." One type of pressure that China bears from the inside is the growing problem of Uighur separatism and its increasingly violent expression. That appears to be the imminent threat to China's territorial integrity, not Vietnam, the Philippines, or Japan.
Another fine nationalist flourish: "As long as the Chinese government is confident, the whole community will stay united." Big deal. Is it not true that as long as the Nazi government was confident, the German community stayed united? This only speaks to the vulnerability of a population to manipulative propaganda from its government. This is not the mark of a great nation, it can be the folly of any nation, and it is quite often the folly of a nation that is struggling against its own inferiority complex to convince itself that it is a great nation. Frankly, China's trash-talking imbues it with all the greatness of a pubescent street punk.
If "China's diplomatic risks are rising," is this perhaps due to China's increasingly risky behavior? "The South China Sea disputes should be settled in a peaceful manner, but that doesn't mean China can't resort to non-peaceful measures in the face of provocation from Vietnam and the Philippines." Such accusations and veiled threats can only increase anxieties in the region and make more acute China's security dilemma. This is a losing strategy. Most bizarre is the assertion that "many people believe that a forced war would convince some countries of China's sincerely peaceful intentions." When has war ever convinced anyone of "sincerely peaceful intentions?" For that matter, what is a "forced war" versus and unforced one? Isn't war a choice, as Clausewitz said, "the extension of policy by other means?"
It is indeed "highly likely that China's strategy would face more uncertainties" if the dispute over the small islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea turned violent. That uncertainty exemplifies the security dilemma. As with tic-tac-toe or global thermonuclear war, the only way to win the game is not to play. For this reason, states have increasingly turned to building collective security institutions, to instituting transparency and confidence-building measures, and to peacefully settling disputes. Talk of "resort to non-peaceful measures" pushes China toward a self-fulfilling prophesy of war.
This crucial time in China's rise and the tensions in the South China Sea are not independent, coincidental events; there is causal linkage that is explained by the security dilemma. The entrepreneurial acumen of the Chinese people will be best showcased by reaching a settlement that satisfies the interests of all concerned parties. Diplomacy is not much different from business; it is all about the art of the deal. And, in contrast to the "security dilemma," a game that no one can win, the well-crafted deal is one in which everyone wins something.
Alternatively, let us consider that at the heart of all of this sound and fury is China's presumption to have a legitimate claim to areas of the South China Sea, and also in the East China Sea, that are well beyond the 12 nautical mile limit of territorial waters. If China believes that it has a solid legal case, what would it have to fear from taking the case to the International Court of Justice?
Twenty-five centuries ago, Sun Tzu wrote: "One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious." The implication is that one can be victorious without fighting; however, a strategist may not cover himself in glory if he gains victory without giving battle, thus he may be forgotten by history. So why not prepare that knock-out legal case that will win without fighting? The problem is that all leaders want to be remembered by history; perhaps, more than anything, this explains the frequency of wars.
